

NSC BRIEFING

19 OCTOBER 1955

## CHINESE WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA

- I. In light of such "spirit of Geneva" actions as the Soviet withdrawal of forces from Austria and relinquishment of the Finnish naval base at Porkkala, Peiping's announcement (29 Sep) that six more Chinese Communist divisions (roughly two Armies) are to be withdrawn from Korea takes on a special significance.
- A. This is the third such public announcement of ChiCom troop withdrawals from Korea since the Armistice (July '53): on each of the previous occasions (Sep '54 and Apr '55) forces totalling some two Armies have been formally marched past the Neutral Nations inspection teams.
- B. The present withdrawal began on 8 October and is still in progress. Upon its completion, remaining ChiCom forces in Korea will total some 350,000 (or about 5 Armies) which, together with some 329,000 North Korean troops, will for the first time be actually outnumbered by the 750,000 UN forces (of whom 685,000 are ROK).
- II. However, the ChiCom forces which <sup>(WILL THEN)</sup> now remain in Korea are so disposed that G-2 believes it likely that any further ChiCom withdrawal will be a total one.
- A. Three of the remaining ChiCom Armies are in front-line positions, while the other two are flanked to east and west, both in opposition to possible seaborne moves against Wonsan or Chinnampo and in support of the <sup>3</sup>front-line Armies.

DOCUMENT NO. 14  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
X DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE 19 Jan 82 REVIEWER: 006514

~~SECRET~~

B. G-2 feels it unlikely that the two backup Armies would be pulled out and the three front-line ones left in position, since such deployment would accept an unnecessary military risk.

III. Under these circumstances, it appears that the logical military step of total withdrawal would also provide the Bloc with a strong psychological position in the general "Geneva spirit."

A. Following such a possible total withdrawal, the ChiComs could charge that the 70,000 Allied forces remaining in Korea were stationed there for offensive purposes and point, in contrast, to the absence of any ChiCom forces.

B. Moreover, this pious Communist position could be achieved at little cost to combat-readiness, since their withdrawn Armies--stationed in Manchuria--could re-enter Korea in a matter of weeks should hostilities be resumed.

C. The Communists, therefore, have much to gain and little to lose by a <sup>FUTURE</sup> complete ChiCom withdrawal from Korea, <sup>WHICH WOULD</sup> thus <sup>PUT</sup> facing the US and the UN <sup>UNDER</sup> propaganda pressure to withdraw Allied forces from Korea <sup>&</sup> and <sup>✓</sup> we believe that the possibility of such an occurrence should be brought to the Council's attention.